Over the past two decades, there has been a paradigm shift in the way the legal system handles most family disputes -particularly disputes involving children. This paradigm shift has replaced the law-oriented and judge-focused model of adjudication with a more collaborative, interdisciplinary and forward-looking family dispute resolution regime. It has also transformed the practice of family law and fundamentally altered the way in which disputing families interact with the legal system. This essay examines the elements of this paradigm shift in family dispute resolution and explores the opportunities and challenges it offers for families, children and the legal system.
Over the past two decades, there has been a paradigm shift in the way the legal system handles most family disputes -particularly disputes involving children. This paradigm shift has replaced the law-oriented and judge-focused adversary model with a more collaborative, interdisciplinary, and forward-looking family dispute resolution regime. It has also transformed the practice of family law and fundamentally altered the way in which disputing families interact with the legal system. Although this "velvet revolution" in family conflict resolution offers many potential benefits for children and for parents, it also poses a number of challenges -both for families and for the judicial system. In this essay, I describe the contours of this paradigm shift and explain why I think it may be a double-edged sword.
I. Elements of the Paradigm Shift
The paradigm shift in family dispute resolution encompasses a number of related components. The first component is a profound skepticism about the value of traditional adversary procedures. An overriding theme of recent divorce reform efforts is that adversary processes are ill-suited for resolving disputes involving children. 2 Relatedly, social science suggests that children's adjustment to divorce and separation depends significantly on their parents' behavior during and after the separation process: the higher the levels of parental conflict to which children are exposed, the more negative the effects of family dissolution. 3 Armed with these social science findings, academics and court reformers have argued that family courts should abandon the adversary paradigm, in favor of approaches that help parents manage their conflict and encourage them to develop positive post-divorce co-parenting relationships. 4 Family courts across the country have embraced this insight and have adopted an array of non-adversary dispute resolution mechanisms designed to avoid adjudication of family cases. 5 This rejection of adversary procedures has moved beyond divorce-related custody disputes --where court-connected mediation is now the norm 6 --to the more 'public' arena of state-initiated child welfare proceedings, where family group conferencing and other problem-solving approaches have begun to supplant more traditional adjudicative models. 7 An increasing number of family lawyers have also rejected the adversary paradigm, in favor of a "collaborative law" model under which lawyers pledge at the outset of their representation not to take a client's case to trial. 8 As two leading reformers recently stated, "in the last quarter century, the process of resolving legal family disputes has, both literally and metaphorically, moved from confrontation toward collaboration and from the courtroom to the conference room."
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A second element of the paradigm shift in family dispute resolution is the belief that most family disputes are not discrete legal events, but ongoing social and emotional Taken together, these developments hold considerable promise for families.
Non-adversary dispute resolution procedures offer families a mode of conflict resolution that is both more enduring and less destructive of ongoing relationships than adversary litigation. 25 Non-adversary processes are also more amenable to direct participation by family members -a particularly important feature, given the high percentage of family litigants who are not represented by counsel. 26 Similarly, judicial interventions that successfully build capacity and enhance problem-solving skills should allow families to avoid the financial and emotional drain of future encounters with the legal system. On a more theoretical level, the paradigm shift in family dispute resolution appropriately rejects the mythology of the private family -a mythology that characterizes "normal" families as fully autonomous and self-sufficient and that labels families that seek -or are subject to --state intervention as dysfunctional or inadequate. The new paradigm recognizes instead that family and state governance are intertwined and that most families need public support in order to function effectively.
II. Concerns and Cautionary Notes
Despite the positive potential of these developments, the paradigm shift in family dispute resolution also raises a number of concerns. One concern highlights the tension between the ideology of post-divorce co-parenting and the clean-break philosophy that underlies no-fault divorce. The new dispute resolution paradigm is committed to shared parenting after divorce or separation, based on the core premise that while divorce may 25 33 The Principles use the term "decision-making responsibility" in place of the more traditional designation of legal custody. See Principles, supra note 17. 34 Id. ('Allocation of Custodial Responsibility' §2.08(1)). 35 Glennon, supra note 31, at 105. 36 Id. at 105-106.
Moreover, the consequences of this mixed message are highly gendered. As the primary caretakers of children -both before and after divorce -women are likely to be doubly disadvantaged by the disconnect between post-divorce economic norms and postdivorce parenting expectations -first by the dissolution of the couple's economic partnership and then by the decision-making restrictions that accompany judiciallymandated post-divorce co-parenting. 37 Relocation law and practice illustrates this gendered impact. 38 Post-divorce relocation disputes have risen dramatically in recent years. 39 In many states, a divorced or separated parent who seeks to change a child's principal residence must first notify the other parent. 40 If the non-residential parent does not consent to the move, the residential parent must obtain judicial permission to relocate. 41 Often that permission is not forthcoming or is conditioned on the requesting parent relinquishing primary residential custody. 42 Significantly, while judges are increasingly likely to restrict a residential parent's ability to relocate, they rarely restrict the mobility of a non-residential parent --even one with joint legal custody and even though the effect on a child of such a move may be just as dramatic and just as negative.
Nor do most courts consider the possibility of a non-residential parent following a residential parent to a new locale when evaluating the residential parent's request to 37 By contrast, primary breadwinners, who are predominantly men, receive the benefits of both modelsfreedom to make a clean economic break, along with the opportunity to be an involved post-divorce parent, even if they undertook minimal childcare responsibilities during marriage. and "is contrary to courts' express commitment to gender equality"). 39 Glennon, supra note 32, at 118. 40 Id. at 119. 41 Id. 42 Id. at 123-25 (reporting on results of a study of reported cases between 2001-2006 that courts granted permission to relocate in fewer that half of the case in which a final decision was made).
move. 43 Even when a court permits a residential parent to relocate, the court may allocate to the relocating parent some or all of the additional costs for the non-relocating parent to visit or otherwise stay in touch with the children. 44 By contrast, courts that deny a residential parent's request to relocate do not compensate that parent for lost economic opportunities. 45 Moreover, joint custody arrangements -both legal and physical --require parents who are able to cooperate, plan and make decisions together. 46 This may be an unrealistic expectation for a significant percentage of post-divorce families, even with the assistance of a parent coordinator -the most recent addition to the dispute resolution continuum in many family courts. 47 Most experts believe that the benefits of joint custody are attenuated -and may be outweighed by the potential for harm -when parents are hostile towards one another or simply cannot get along. 48 Moreover, several studies suggest that joint custody arrangements are particularly likely to change over time. 49 To the extent that these changes exacerbate conflict or require ongoing court intervention, the harm to children may outweigh any benefits associated with legally mandated shared custody.
A dogged allegiance to post-divorce co-parenting may also conflict with our commitment to family privacy. Principles of constitutional law, as well as traditional family law doctrine, place a high value on parental autonomy and are wary about ongoing state involvement in family life. 50 Parents who are subject to -or repeatedly seek -court oversight of their parenting relationship risk jeopardizing this commitment to family autonomy. When family disputes are viewed not as discrete legal events, but as opportunities for therapeutic, holistic, and interdisciplinary interventions, such ongoing state involvement in family life becomes disconcertingly easy to justify.
Another area of concern focuses on the institutional competence of courts.
Although families may benefit from the capacity-building and problem-solving approaches embraced by the new paradigm, it is unclear whether courts are competent to provide these services. violations of individual due process rights. 54 Critics suggest that the "one judge-one family" policy that underlies the new dispute-resolution paradigm may raise similar due process concerns. 55 Concentrating treatment resources in the court system may also detract from their availability in the wider community and may create an undesirable shift from community to court-based interventions. Such a shift may lead state authorities to file cases, and individuals to submit to the court's jurisdiction, in order to access services unavailable elsewhere, creating a vicious cycle of dependence on court-connected intervention. 56 Burgeoning family court dockets, coupled with declining state resources, present a final set of concerns. To implement the new paradigm effectively, court systems will need to recruit and train additional judicial and non-judicial staff. These include mediators, parent educators, custody evaluators, parent coordinators and other quasijudicial officers. But resources available for family courts are declining, while their caseloads continue to grow -due, in part, to increases in post-divorce parenting disputes. 57 As a result, scarce resources are spread even more thinly and courts may have difficulty meeting both their basic adjudicative functions and the broader, more ambitious goals of the new family conflict resolution paradigm.
Conclusion
So what lessons do I take from these concerns? Certainly not that they merit a rejection of the new paradigm or a return to a full-fledged adversary regime. However, they do suggest that family court reformers should be mindful of the costs and unintended consequences of even the most well-intentioned court interventions. Thus, in addition to "fitting the forum to the family fuss," 58 reformers should make sure that the resolution fits both the family and the judicial system. Post-divorce co-parenting is not for everyone;
nor is it the only way of ensuring that children maintain a meaningful relationship with both parents. In particular, joint legal custody may be contraindicated where parents have exhausted the dispute resolution continuum and are still unable to reach an agreement. In other words, parents who insist on adjudication of their initial parenting dispute are unlikely to be good candidates for future joint decision-making. Developing a more disengaged "parallel parenting" strategy may be both more realistic and more beneficial for them and their children. 59 Finally, proponents of the new paradigm might consider "divorcing" some of the services on the family dispute resolution continuum from the court system. A promising model may be a recent reform effort in Australia that introduced community-based "family relationship centres," whose mission is to direct parenting disagreements away from the court system entirely and into community based institutions. 60 Those of us who went to law school "to make a difference in people's lives," often look first to courtbased solutions to social problems. But sometimes the most effective solutions may lie outside our jurisdiction.
